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This paper examines the fiscal challenges that the new EU member states in
Central and Eastern Europe (NEW-8) are facing that arise from both EU
membership and from developments that are essentially independent of EU
membership. While the direct fiscal strains caused by EU membership may
appear to be only short term and of minor importance, they are more
challenging when regarded in the context of the impact on the NEW-8 of
globalization (locational competition) and country-specific structural
characteristics. It is argued that there is an urgent need for fiscal reforms in
these countries that requires both determination with respect to restructuring
the budget and innovativeness in regard of increasing the efficiency of public
spending and collecting tax revenues. Several reform options are discussed.
1 This paper is an updated version of a study which was originally prepared for the IMF’s
Fiscal Affairs Department. The views expressed in the paper are those of the author and do not
represent those of the IMF.
2 A first version of this paper was written in 2004 when the author was a consultant to the
Fiscal Affairs Department of IMF. The author is grateful to Eva Peilert, Konrad Stockmeier, Jürgen
Ehler and A. Gonciarz for research assistance, and Manmohan Kumar, Mark de Broeck and
Ashoka Mody for helpful comments.TABLE OF CONTENTS
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On 1 May 2004, ten countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the
Mediterranean joined the European Union (EU). Eight of these countries
(NEW-8) are former communist countries that have been engaged in
a transition process over the past 15 years, making the switch from a planned
to a market economy, involving fundamental institutional and structural
changes in the economies concerned. To prevent severe setbacks in this
transformation process and fasten the development and catch-up process
vis-à-vis the more highly developed western market economies, these
countries decided to strive for early EU membership. In doing this, they
placed great hopes in greater financial aid by the EU, in larger FDI flows and
a quicker implementation of the necessary structural reforms (hoping that
pressure from outside through the EU convergence criteria could help to
overcome political resistances to these reforms).
These expected advantages of striving for an early EU membership had to be
bought at the cost of stronger challenges (in particular fiscal ones) in the
following years. The decision for an early EU membership meant in
particular, apart from its advantages, (i) additional expenditures as well as
more severe adjustment and austerity measures, and (ii) quicker exposure to
international competition (globalization) which led not only to chances but
also to dangers with respect to a revenue shortfall through competitive
pressure (tax competition) and to higher risk of financial crises. This must be
seen against the background of long-term structural problems in the NEW-8,
such as rapidly aging populations and the general need to upgrade
infrastructure. The various fiscal challenges arising from these developments
and requirements can jointly lead to politically and socially painful crisis
processes in these countries that will tend to deepen and that can only be
prevented through intelligent and unwavering economic policy. For this, early
policy reforms are required. This paper examines these various fiscal
challenges, shows the linkages between them and evaluates their relative
importance. Furthermore, it discusses the economic policy reforms necessary
to master these challenges.
The paper is guided by the basic idea that the new member countries should
not pursue a short-sighted policy course. That is, they should focus their
attention not so much on how to join the European Monetary Union (EMU)
as soon as possible to become a “full” member of the euro club. Instead, they
7should concentrate in the next few years on carrying out the major policy
adjustments necessary for mastering the challenges mentioned above, without
high costs, later on in the EMU (without the instruments of flexible exchange
rates and autonomous monetary and fiscal policies).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 investigates the
direct fiscal challenges of the EU membership for the NEW-8 over the next
years. The fiscal challenges that have so far been in the (political) spotlight
are the increase in expenditures and revenues that the NEW-8 can expect from
EU membership in the near future. Section 3 analyzes further fiscal
challenges that have not yet been in the (political) spotlight as much, but seem
to be even more important for the development of these countries. These are
the challenges that will affect these countries through their exposure to
globalization and the need to upgrade their infrastructure and react to their
rapidly aging populations. Section 4 deals with the economic policy reforms
necessary to master all these fiscal challenges. Section 5 concludes.
Section 2 argues that though, in general, the net fiscal effects from EU
membership are likely to be positive in the medium term, there will most
likely be fiscal strains on the NEW-8 in the short term, as the positive indirect
effects on the budget (via improvement of institutions, or deregulation) will
emerge only gradually and/or preceded EU entrance. Section 3 argues that
globalization and specific structural characteristics in the NEW-8 lead in
particular (i) to a tendency toward a decrease in tax revenues and (ii) to a need
to upgrade infrastructure and improve the quality of institutions, and thus to
an imminent finance gap that should be met early in advance. EU membership
will tend to increase the need to reduce this finance gap as there is the threat
of a conflict with the obligations from EU membership (Maastricht criteria
and the Stability and Growth Pact). On the other hand, there are vague
expectations with respect to EU/EMU membership leading to an increase in
economic growth and possibly to expansionary fiscal consolidation.
Section 4 emphasizes that the need for fiscal reforms requires determination
with respect to restructuring the budget and innovativeness with regard to
increasing the efficiency of public spending and collecting tax revenues, and
discusses several options.
8 Introduction2. Fiscal Challenges of EU Membership
The NEW-8 can expect to receive significant transfers from the EU, but will
also face pressures on public spending during the next years. They will have
to co-finance EU-funded projects, and implementation of EU regulations will
involve fiscal costs. Additional fiscal costs will come from EU membership
contributions and alignment with EU customs and taxes. Altogether, the net
fiscal effects in the coming years are not straightforward, and there can be
small gains or losses for the individual NEW-8 countries. In general, the net
fiscal effects from EU membership are likely to be positive in the medium
term. In the short term, however, there will most likely be fiscal strains on the
NEW-8. All the authors that have recently estimated the net direct budgetary
effects of EU membership (e.g., Schadler et al., (2005), Kopits and Székely,
(2004), Antczak, (2003)) have come up with a negative direct net effect
during the first years of the membership. Their estimates range between
–1 and –4.75 percent of GDPper year (for the details of a pessimistic estimate
see Table 1).
A. Expenditures
Compliance with EU regulations (the Acquis Communautaire) has resulted
in additional public expenditure in the NEW-8.
3 Further public expenditures
will be necessary in the coming years to fully implement these regulations.
4
For the reform of public administration due to EU membership Kopits and
Székely (2004) have calculated costs up to 1.5 % of GDP (Table 1). Afurther
challenge for the NEW-8 is that they will need to co-finance project-based EU
transfers (with variation across countries, see Table 2).
5 A significant part of
9
3 There are various compliance costs, among them the costs of environmental protection, and
transport that have to be regarded as major expenditure items (EPC, (2003a), EBRD, (2005)).
4 However, Hallet (2004) argues that the “largest part of the cost will fall on the private sector
and should not trigger substantial public expenditure” (p. 15).
5 The area of the NEW-8 belongs, for the most part, to areas classified by the EU as covered
by “Objective I”. In such areas, the quota for co-financing transfers for rural development from
the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund is 25% (COUNCIL REGULATION
(EC) No 1257/1999, Chapter IV, Article 47). The quota for transfers from the Structural Fund is
25–15% (COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1260/1999, TITLE III, Chapter I, Article 29), for
transfers from the Cohesion Fund 20–15% (COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1164/94, Article
7). Further specifications in special cases hold for all these quotas. (The Council Regulations are
taken from the Official Journals of the European Communities L 130 05/25/1994, L 160/80
06/26/1999, and L 161/1 06/26/1999.)the appropriations will be project-related. It is probable that some projects
will not be able to be realized
6 since there is still a lack of professional,
administrative and financial capacities reducing the new member countries’
ability to completely absorb and use effectively the post-accession grants
from the EU’s cohesion and structural funds (EBRD, (2005)).
7
Another major challenge for the NEW-8 is that they will need to pay their
membership dues to the EU from the beginning. The NEW-8 must pay
contributions to the EU budget (roughly € 3.13 billion in 2004, and
€ 5.31 billion in 2005)
8 under the same rules as the old members. Their total
contributions for the period 2004-06 are estimated to be around € 16 billion
(Antczak, (2003)). To prevent a deterioration in the net budgetary balance
vis-à-vis the EU, the Czech Republic and Slovenia will be granted temporary
compensation of close to € 1 billion until the end of the current financing
period. In addition, all the NEW-8 will be provided with funds from
a cash-flow facility (in total € 2.4 billion up to the end of 2006).
Furthermore, both the Maastricht criteria (including the 3 percent of GDP
deficit ceiling and the 60 percent of GDP public debt limit) and the Stability
and Growth Pact (SGP) are part of the Acquis Communautaire and will
apply immediately upon accession. This will result in significant challenges
in reducing fiscal deficits. However, the SGP may be less significant for the
NEW-8 as long as they do not adopt the euro. The reason is that before euro
adoption neither the EU Commission nor the European Council can impose
sanctions against any of the NEW-8 that do not fulfill the rules of the SGP.
However, this does not exclude sanctions by the financial markets. 
Before Euro adoption, the only real challenge will be fulfillment of the
Maastricht criteria as the formal precondition for Euro adoption. Currently,
10 Fiscal Challenges of EU Membership
6 There are estimates that the actual transfers might be only around 60 percent of the
appropriations with variation across countries (Richter, (2003)). Furthermore, those project-related
transfers that are channelled to the budget (part of these transfers are channelled directly to private
sector recipients) have to be pre-financed by the government.
7 In the medium term, the implementation of the EU Social Charter may also induce
considerable fiscal costs (for the private and the public sectors) in the NEW-8. The EU Social
Charter prescribes a weekly maximum working time, minimum recreation periods, minimum
safety standards, minimum time for maternity leave, rules for the employment of minors, equal
treatment of gender, dismissal protection rules for pregnant women and many additional workers’
rights. However, in the short term, various country-specific transition arrangements will tend to
dampen these effects.
8 See the Official Journal of the European Union C 105, Vol. 47, 30 April 2004, and the
“Preliminary Draft of the General Budget of the European Communities for the Financial Year
2005”, published by the Directorate General Budget of the European Commission.the most critical criterion for the NEW-8 is the deficit criterion which is
violated by many of them. The larger NEW-8 (the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, and the Slovak Republic) far exceeded the deficit reference value of
3 percent of GDP in the last years. By contrast, the small NEW-8 (the Baltic
States and Slovenia) have experienced only minor deficits for years (see
Figure 1). Reducing the budget deficit to a sufficient extent and,
simultaneously, meeting the need for infrastructure investments to promote
real convergence may prove difficult, particularly for the larger NEW-8.
The mobility of production factors is also an integral part of the Acquis
Communautaire. However, the fiscal implications of this may be rather
limited during the initial years of EU membership since capital mobility has
already been implemented almost completely in the NEW-8 before EU
membership,
9 and full labor mobility will likely not to be implemented until
2011 against the background of administrative constraints (“transition
arrangements”) legally built up by the incumbents.
10 Nevertheless, the new as
well as the old members of the EU today already need to take into account the
challenges from labor migration. With the exception of Slovenia, the wage
gap vis-à-vis old member countries is huge, compared even to the “poorer”
member countries of the EU-15 (see Figure 2), and there is also large
unemployment in several of the NEW-8, particularly in Poland and the Slovak
Republic (Figure 3). This may cause a strong incentive for workers to migrate
from East to West Europe. However, the extent of labor migration to be
expected as a consequence of EU enlargement is uncertain.
11
But EU membership may also have some positive expenditure effects in the
sense of a decrease in government expenditures. According to the Acquis
Communautaire  production subsidies must be eliminated which is
estimated to have a positive budgetary effect for the NEW-8 (in Poland even
Fiscal Challenges of EU Membership 11
9 Removal of the few remaining barriers to capital trade in the coming years was
a precondition for entry of the acceding countries into the EU.
10 The old members may reject the immigration of workers from the NEW-8 for up to five
years (plus a two-year extension). Access to the labor markets will still only be possible with
a work permit during this period. Almost all the EU-15 countries will follow this line. The United
Kingdom will also restrict entitlements to social benefits, although this is a difficult issue under
Union law.
11 Different languages and cultures, as well as remaining institutional hindrances in the labor
markets, may prevent many people leaving their native countries despite the existing wage
differences in Europe. But differences in language and culture may not be such a big problem for
the skilled portion of the younger generation in the NEW-8, and hopes for quick real convergence
may be disappointed. This means, it may be the young skilled workers who will migrate if real
convergence only proceeds slowly, and this would lead to a brain drain and thus to slower real
convergence in the NEW-8.up to 2% of GDP, see Table 1). However, the NEW-8 were allowed rather
long periods for the phasing-out of production subsidies so that the fiscal
implications will be very limited in the near future.
12 A further decrease in
government expenditures occurs due to reduced interest rate risk premia.
The EU served as an external institutional anchor for the NEW-8 even before
they entered the EU, with the consequence of a considerable progress in terms
of institutions, transparency etc. From investors’ perspectives, this progress
made the accession countries a more secure place to do business. This led to
lower risk premia in these countries. This development may continue after EU
accession (when acceding to the Eurozone) because the pressure on the
NEW-8 for further institutional reforms remains. 
B. Revenues
The NEW-8 will receive significant transfers from the EU budget. Until
the end of 2006, the new EU member countries are entitled to receive
€ 21.7 billion in structural aid and € 9.8 billion in the framework of the EU
agricultural policy in addition to € 9.3 billion in the frameworks of internal
policies, administration, and budgetary compensations (see Table 3).
13 Total
receipts as a percentage of the GDP of recipient countries will vary inversely
with the level of GDP. Structural aid will mainly go to public infrastructure,
transport, the business sector, and to education. How much of the transfers
that the NEW-8 will actually receive depends crucially on their capacities to
absorb project-related transfers, which must be co-financed (see above). It is
feared in the NEW-8 that with absorption rates being too low, some NEW-8
could even become financial net losers (Antczak, (2003)). The dilemma
appears that from avoiding the net loser position there accrues expansionary
pressure on the NEW-8’s national budgets because a higher absorption of EU
transfers implies more co-financing.
Minor budgetary savings to the NEW-8 arise from tax harmonization that
matters in the field of value added tax (VAT) only. It is estimated that there
will be a small revenue gain, at most 0.5 percent of GDP (Table 1). However,
according to EU requirements (maximum standard rate 25 percent, minimum
standard rate 15 percent, reduced rate 5 percent) VAT rates in the NEW-8
12 Fiscal Challenges of EU Membership
12 See Funck (2002), Kopits and Székely (2004), and Römisch (2003) for further discussion.
13 What will be beyond 2006 is uncertain as for this period the EU budget has not yet been
agreed. However, it is not unlikely that the NEW-8 could then be eligible to receive relatively large
grants on a per capita basis.were already harmonized before entrance into the EU. On the other hand,
most accession countries had higher customs duties than the EU-15
members, and the loss in this revenue item can be up to 0.5 percent of GDP
for some NEW-8 (Table 1). However, in general, the loss of revenues from
this item tends to be marginal as these duties were already very low before
EU entrance in most entering countries.
Furthermore, an increase in tax revenues as a share of GDPis often expected
due to EU membership leading to higher economic growth in the new
member countries.
14 More generally, there is also evidence of a positive
correlation between the level of per capita income and revenue ratios.
However, as trade between the NEW-8 and the EU-15 had already been
substantially liberalized since the 1990s, the growth related gains from EU
accession arising from further trade integration will be limited.
15
Nevertheless, the overall growth effect of EU accession in the NEW-8 is,
while difficult to assess exactly, with a high probability positive if we assume
that further institutional improvements, further import of macroeconomic
stability, further trade integration (although not excessive) and a further
decrease in interest rate risk premia foster economic growth (Facchini and
Segnana, (2003)). Given that the tax systems contain elements of tax
progression, this will also tend to lead to higher tax revenues. But this latter
condition does not need to be fulfilled in the light of strong locational (tax)
competition (see the following section 3). As the design of tax systems and
welfare systems remains under the autonomy of the single member countries,
apart from the VAT requirements, EU membership has no direct influence on
tax incomes in the NEW-8.
16
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14 The projected increases in growth affected by EU accession are estimated to be between
1 and 2 percentage points per year (for several years) in the NEW-8 (cf. EEAG, (2004)). By
contrast, the old members can only expect slight growth effects from EU enlargement (alone due
to the small economic weight of the NEW-8 in the EU) (see, e.g., Heijdra et al., (2002)).
15 Under the Europe Agreements, goods trade has largely been deregulated over the past few
years, with tariffs and import quotas being almost entirely abolished. The free movement of capital
has been a reality for some time, too. What has been new from May 2004 onwards is freedom to
provide services and freedom of establishment. However, there are transition arrangements for
this, as well as with respect to freedom of movement for persons, border controls, and application
of EU laws on competition and state aid.
16 Of course, the extent of the fiscal implications derived in this and the following sections
depends on the binding of the rules set up in the EU Treaty and in other commitments. One has to
be aware that rules and even constitutional laws can be changed. This means that these legal
frameworks are endogenous for the NEW-8 insofar as they can expect to have influence (by
creating political majorities) on the decision-making process within the EU. This may affect the
binding of the Maastricht criteria (as an entrance barrier for euro adoption), the reform of the SGP,
the extent of transfers after 2006, a well as tax and other regulations.3. Fiscal Challenges through Structural Changes
The net fiscal effects of EU membership described in section 2 do not appear
to be (per se, in terms of magnitude) the decisive fiscal challenge for the
NEW-8 over the coming years. However, the burden of EU membership may
prove troublesome against the background of additional fiscal challenges in
these countries. These additional challenges are the (largely medium-term)
effects induced by the structural characteristics of these countries. In this
section I shall analyze two major developments that can trigger much larger
fiscal challenges for the new member countries than the direct effects of EU
membership. These two effects are based on:
(1)The fact that the NEW-8 had to open their markets at an early stage and
face up to the challenge of international competition (“globalization”).
This forces them to confront tax competition and upgrade infrastructure.
Furthermore, the fact that the NEW-8 are still emerging market
economies, and are still in transition, makes them vulnerable to financial
crises against the background of open markets, especially in the run-up to
euro adoption. This forces them to further upgrade their financial and
institutional infrastructure in particular.
(2)Unfavorable structural characteristics. The NEW-8 still have a substantial
need to upgrade their whole infrastructure. Moreover, they suffer from the
mounting problem of rapidly aging populations. Even if this demographic
shift is a medium- to long-term development in the NEW-8, it has
far-reaching short- to medium-term consequences, insofar as early
political reactions aiming at speedy structural reforms are necessary to
master this long-term challenge. It forces these countries to install
affordable pension systems today and to undertake painful structural cuts
in health care payments and other fringe benefits, in order to prevent
increasingly dramatic fiscal burdens from arising.
A. Globalization
Globalization is a major challenge for all countries. For the NEW-8, however,
it is a rather new challenge generated by the system transformation and
further enhanced by EU-accession. One may suppose that the NEW-8
countries are affected by globalization to varying degrees, depending on how
15deeply they are already integrated in the world economy. One classic measure
for the degree of globalization within a country is the degree of openness. It
is generally assumed that smaller countries are more open. And indeed
Poland, as by far the largest NEW-8 country, has the lowest degree of
openness (Table 4). Another classic measure for the degree of globalization is
financial market integration. This integration has increased significantly in all
NEW-8 countries over the last years, since a complete opening of the capital
markets was a precondition for EU entrance, however with some remaining
variance across the single countries with respect to progress in financial
market reform (see Table 5 for credit ratings as one possible measure of
financial market integration in the NEW-8, and Table 6 for some financial
market reform indicators). 
Danger of fiscal gaps due to locational competition
Potential problems
With their decision to transform to a market economy (and thus to open trade
and capital flows), the former planned economies have chosen to face the
competition imposed by the globalization process. Globalization leads to
higher mobility of factors of production and increases the locational
competition for mobile production factors among regions and countries
(Wagner, (2001)). Even without becoming an EU/EMU member, the NEW-8
would have to face the new (locational or systems) competition
17 to attract the
capital they need for development. Major locational competition factors that
make a country or region an attractive location for investment and that can be
influenced by the government are tax levels, subsidies, and infrastructure
expenditures.
18
Fiscal incentives in the form of low tax rates, high subsidies and infrastructure
expenditures to influence these locational decisions tend to lead to an increase
in the budget deficit, at least in the short run. This fiscal challenge need not
be a bad thing because, like a private firm, a government competes for good
customers (here, mobile factors of production), and to be successful in the
16 Fiscal Challenges through Structural Changes
17 For the concepts of “locational competition” or “(new) systems competition” see, in more
detail, Siebert (1996) or Sinn (2003).
18 Further factors are the level of education, regulation systems (property rights, contract
enforcement), and macroeconomic and political stability. Other major locational factors that are
not directly influenced by the government are wages, motivation and flexibility of workers, social
harmony, and innovativeness. All these factors have a considerable influence on the returns an
investor can expect to earn in a specific country or region. cf. Wagner (2001).locational competition, it has to make advance payments and take investment
or development credits. There would, however, be a problem for the NEW-8
if such a locational or system competition led to a vicious circle or were
ruinous. This is often argued to be the case with respect to tax competition.
For some academics and policy makers, increasing mobility of capital has
been a cause for concern because governments often compete for investment
through tax incentives that ignore the detrimental effect on other countries or
regions
19. The main argument is that if all countries offer such incentives,
their effect on capital movement will be eliminated, but all governments will
be worse off as their revenue will be reduced. In the vast literature on tax
competition,
20 this fiscal externality leads to too low tax rates and the
under-provision of public goods in equilibrium (‘race to the bottom’).
21 In
other words, it is considered a threat to the modern welfare state (see also
Box 1).
22
Fiscal Challenges through Structural Changes 17
19 Another concern about tax competition relates to possible distortions of this competition
which could occur if foreign investors were to receive preferential treatment. In order to avoid
such unfair tax competition practices, the EU has adopted a code of conduct regarding company
taxation (EC, (2005)).
20 This branch of literature was originated by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson
(1986), and surveyed by Wilson (1999).
21 The race-to-the-bottom hypothesis asserts that competition for a mobile tax base produces
sub-optimally low taxes, with the mobile factor bearing too little of the tax burden. 
22 For a broad analysis of this argument see, e.g., Sinn (2003).18 Fiscal Challenges through Structural Changes
Box 1: Tax competition
The basic argument on which most of the literature on tax competition is based asserts
that a small open economy can have no interest in putting a source tax on
internationally mobile capital since capital can always shift the tax burden. The source
tax would drive away mobile capital so that the domestic product and the marginal
productivity (and hence the income) of the immobile factors of production both fall.
23
This basic argument is illustrated in Figure I, which describes the decision situation of
a single country. We suppose that the country produces a homogeneous output using
capital K and labor L, where F(K,L) is a linearly homogeneous production function.
We further suppose that capital is internationally mobile and available in any amount
at the net world market return r, whereas the amount of labor is fixed and provided by
domestic residents. 
The downward sloping line in Figure I describes the marginal product of capital. Firms
invest up to the point where the marginal product of capital equals the net world market
return. Without a tax, firms are assumed to invest up to the point where FK = r*. Here,
the factors labor and capital receive incomes ADE and D0K0E, respectively. If the
government imposes a source tax on capital equal to t = BD, the amount of capital used
will fall to K1. Capital will leave the country until its net marginal product after tax is
again equal to the net world market return r: FK – t = r*.
Wage income will fall to ABC. Assuming that tax revenues BDFC are paid to the wage
earners, the total rent of the immobile factor amounts to ADFC. Thus, despite this
income redistribution, labor suffers losses of CFE. Whether the mobile capital is
domestic or foreign is irrelevant for this argument.
Figure I. Erosion of source taxes in tax competition
23 See MacDougall (1960) and Richman (1963).However, as argued above, tax incentives are not the only way through which
the governments of the NEW-8 countries can compete for internationally
mobile capital. Another important fiscal incentive is the provision of
infrastructure goods,
24 which has, at least partly, to be financed by tax
revenues. In other words, what matters for the competitiveness of the NEW-8
regions or countries is the optimal mix of public infrastructure (including
social infrastructure) and taxation. Therefore, a natural barrier seems to exist
that weakens the erosive powers of tax competition: If taxes are regarded as
the price that has to be paid for the publicly provided infrastructure, the
investors will accept them. However, the main problem with this reasoning
lies in the fact that it abstracts from the public good character of
infrastructure. Public infrastructure may be described as a public good for
which there is only a limited rivalry in use. With small marginal usage costs
the taxes on mobile capital generate too low revenues. In a closed economy
(with no transborder capital mobility) it may be possible to impose taxes on
capital such that each capital unit pays taxes equivalent to the average costs
of providing public infrastructure. In an open economy (with transborder
capital mobility), however, locational competition prevents the government
from equating taxes on the mobile factor with the supply costs of public
infrastructure. As already explained above, if not all factors of production are
mobile, the burden of taxation can (theoretically) be shifted to the more
immobile factors of production, which usually includes labor. In the extreme,
there could be no taxation of capital (the mobile factor) whereas all the tax
burden would lie on labor (the less mobile factor). In practice, this extreme
solution will not be implementable in democracies because of political
reasons (workers are voters). But nonetheless tax competition may lead to
inefficiently low levels of public services and/or too high budget deficits.
Furthermore, the NEW-8 will face some furthertax competition induced by
factor mobility incentives. Since the relevant effective taxes in the NEW-8
are usually lower than in the former EU-15 members, it is sometimes argued
that the downward pressure on the tax rates of the former is likely to be small
or non-existent. However, against the preceding discussion, this appears to be
incorrect. For attracting further FDI, the NEW-8 may need to establish even
lower taxation of production factors since their provision of relatively weaker
infrastructure is a locational disadvantage that has to be compensated by
Fiscal Challenges through Structural Changes 19
24 As various surveys have confirmed, FDIs can particularly be attracted either by offering
foreign companies comparatively low direct costs (wages or taxes in particular), or comparatively
good infrastructure because better infrastructure can mean lower costs and/or higher productivity
for companies (cf. UNCTAD, (2003), Chap. III, and OECD, (2004), Chap. 3).offering other locational advantages, such as lower taxes and/or lower wages.
Therefore, in the short run there may arise a conflict between the need for
lower taxes, leading to lower tax incomes, and the need to finance further
infrastructure investment to foster real convergence. However, in the medium
term, by attracting FDI and thus fostering growth and real convergence,
lowering taxes may increase tax incomes. In addition, in the medium term,
infrastructure also tends to be improved and areas of industrial concentration
tend to be created so that tax competition may become less important for
attracting FDI (see the following).
Qualifications
There are also other factors relevant for the location of a firm that have been
argued to counterbalance the downward pressure on capital tax rates due to
tax competition. Among them are areas of industrial concentration. In this
context, an important insight of the economic geography models is that
agglomeration forces can turn mobile factors (capital) into quasi-fixed
factors (Baldwin et al., (2003)). Agglomeration forces mean that spatial
concentration of economic activity generates forces that favor further spatial
concentration. This branch of literature argues that a race to the bottom in
capital tax rates does not need to take place even though capital is becoming
increasingly mobile. When capital mobility increases, the capital tax rate is
expected (in this branch of literature) to fall in countries with low
concentrations of production, while in countries with high concentrations of
production, a higher level of capital income taxation should be able to be
sustained.
In the NEW-8, a number of areas of industrial concentration seem to already
exist. Figures 4.a – 4.d show the degree of regional industrial concentration
in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic, measured
by the number of employers for different branches, whereas Figures
5.a – 5.d show the degree of regional concentration with regard to R&D
expenditures.
Furthermore, it is sometimes argued that, even if there is a race to the bottom in
tax competition, this need not necessarily be disastrous.The welfare-decreasing
effects of tax competitionderived in the traditional tax competition literature are
partly based on the assumption of benevolent governments. By contrast, the
Leviathan view of government, taken by the public choice literature, assumes
that policy makers are self-interested and governments are rent-seeking
institutions that accumulate resources for the pursuit of their own ends and
20 Fiscal Challenges through Structural Changestherefore tend to set taxes too high.
25 As a consequence, the Leviathan
government hypothesis asserts that the race to the bottom in tax competition
may actually be welfare-enhancing in the sense that it may yield a second best
improvement. The basic argument is that competition curbs rent-seeking
activities of politicians. Therefore, in the extreme, even no tax revenue might
benefit voters because the potential loss in public good provision may be
outweighed by an increase in private consumption.
It is further argued that globalization-driven locational competition can
contribute to fiscal discipline by forcing governments to more transparency,
and thus to implement sound macroeconomic policies and reforms
consistently to improve their investment climate in order to attract foreign
direct investments (IMF, (2003b), p. 6). Thus it does “act as a force for stability
by limiting the scope for countries to pursue policies that are incompatible
with medium–term financial stability” (Citrin and Fischer, (2000), p. 27). On
the whole, this could increase budgetary efficiency and reduce unproductive
government expenditures. In doing this it could partly counteract the above
mentioned tendency towards an increase in the budget deficit due to fiscal
incentives in the context of locational or systems competition. However,
despite of the theoretical plausibility of this “disciplinary effect”, it is
apparently not easy to find strong and robust empirical evidence (cf. Tytell
and Wei, (2004)). Moreover, this effect is questioned by some economists on
the basis of the so-called Selection Principle. This principle states that “ideal
market conditions tend to exist in private competition but not in competition
between states, and this raises doubts as to the efficiency of systems
competition even if national governments are too ignorant or selfish to actively
pursue a policy of national welfare maximization” (Sinn, (2003), p. 9).
26
Furthermore, even if the disciplinary effect described above takes place, this
may take a while:
27 as long as the migration responses of the mobile factors
of production are slow, a long period of time can pass before a country is
forced to react to a policy move of another country.
28
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25 Voters must allow politicians some rents for them to seek re-election. This, however, has the
consequence that the closed economy entails too high taxes for the first best solution to be
achieved.
26 See also Sinn (1997).
27 Particularly for the NEW-8 countries, this may be a problem, as they still may be regarded
as newly built (and hence impatient) democracies. Nonetheless, over time, fiscal discipline should
improve the budgetary situation and enable governments to finance better infrastructure and thus
to attract more FDIs and avoid outflows of domestic capital (and labor).
28 However, those smaller NEW-8 countries which have a high degree of openness and flexible
market structures might (be forced to) react sooner than a large and hence (perhaps) more
inflexible country.Risk of financial crises
As early as the mid-nineties (i.e., only a few years after the end of the
communist regime), the NEW-8 states applied for EU membership. When
they started negotiations, the states had to commit themselves to fully opening
their capital markets, i.e. to lifting any capital controls, before they joined the
EU. This quick exposure to financial globalization was profitable for these
countries because they received urgently needed (additional) foreign direct
investments (see Figure 6). However, in the short to medium term, as long as
these countries keep their own currencies, this early exposure of the NEW-8
to globalization involves some danger of instability, because of the fact that
these countries are still in transition and are emerging market economies. As
the recent literature suggests (see Box 2), emerging market countries face
greater exposure to a sudden end of capital inflows and to liquidity crises.
This may create large fiscal challenges for the NEW-8 in the event of a crisis
in the run-up to euro adoption.
29
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Box 2: Risk of Sudden Stops in Emerging Market Economies
Acommon pattern in emerging market economies is that capital mobility is associated
with high volatility of capital flows. After capital account liberalization, emerging
market economies in the wake of macro stabilization typically experience a large
upsurge of capital inflows. According to traditional explanations, such inflows tend to
be driven, to a large extent, by the attractiveness of short-term profit opportunities
from speculative positions, due to the fact that, just after capital account liberalization,
country risk and/or inflation tend to keep domestic interest rates high relative to
international rates. But the traditional approach cannot explain the second
phenomenon that is often observed in emerging market economies: the sudden reversal
in capital inflows (“sudden stop”). The evolving literature on sudden stops does not yet
have a clear explanation of the factors triggering sudden stops either (cf. BIS, (2003)).
However, it appears to be uncontested that the risk of sudden stops can be favored by
weak fiscal and financial institutions and weak fiscal policy in emerging market
economies (Calvo and Mishkin, (2003)). Sudden stops could also be a major source of
fiscal unsustainability in emerging market economies (cf. Alvarado et al., (2004)).
Because sudden stops in capital inflows make it necessary to adjust the current account
deficit which requires a large depreciation of the real exchange rate, this may have
serious consequences for serving foreign debt and hence result in financing
problems.
30
29 Further challenges emerging market economies face are low credibility of monetary
institutions and dollarization/euroization of liabilities (Calvo and Mishkin, (2003), Eichengreen et
al., (2003)). However, these challenges are less relevant for the NEW-8. By joining the EU, the
NEW-8 have committed themselves to strict coordination of their monetary policies with the ECB. →The danger of sudden stops cannot be excluded either in the NEW-8, since
these are also still emerging market economies. Figure 7 shows the net capital
inflows into the NEW-8 since 1995. Both, large fiscal deficits (such as in
some of the larger NEW-8, see Figure 1a) and wide current account
imbalances (such as in the Baltic States, see Figure 8) could create major
financing needs and potential vulnerabilities. In the NEW-8, fiscal deficits
persistently much larger than three percent of GDP can be regarded as not
acceptable in view of the countries’ envisaged accession to the European
Monetary Union and the convergence criteria requirements associated with
this accession.
31 With respect to the NEW-8, many economists argue that in
the context of an intermediate exchange rate regime, such as ERM II,
32 high
capital inflows and outflows could shake the exchange rate in single NEW-8
countries and lead to dangerous speculative attacks there (and possibly then
spread to other NEW-8 countries) (see, e.g., Gibson and Tsakalotos, (2004),
see also Begg et al., (2003)). However, one has also to take into account that
the exchange rate band of the ERM-II regime is rather broad (+/– 15%), and
the ECB is obligated to help ERM-II-member countries out of crises if this
does not violate its main obligation of securing price stability in the EMU.
Nonetheless, the question of a rather broad ERM band is not yet finally
decided,
33 and, moreover, high short-term external debt ratio in Lithuania, the
Slovak Republic, the Czech Republic and Poland can be interpreted as
a matter of concern (see Figure 9; see also Hughes Hallett and Lewis, (2004)).
Concentrating on external sources of finance, which may lead to wide current
account imbalances (such as in the Baltic countries), also creates risks.
Evidence from a number of currency crises in emerging market countries
suggests that the composition of capital inflows matters. Reliance on
short-term borrowing to finance large current account deficits tends to be
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Furthermore, “the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) data indicate that their (Emerging
Europe’s) lending in domestic currency has increased substantially” (IMF, (2004b), p. 40).
30 Moreover, preliminary evidence suggests that such developments spread via “contagion”, so
that there is a high degree of bunching of sudden stops across emerging market economies. Here,
expectation processes may play a crucial role as a driving force; see, for example, Chang and
Velasco (2000, 2001), and, with special reference to the contagion process, Berger and Wagner
(2005).
31 Nor can large fiscal deficits be sustained without, sooner or later, violating the debt
convergence criterion (cf. Hughes Hallett and Lewis, (2004)). Here the situation is worst in the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic (Figure 1). These countries show the
largest deficit rates as well as the greatest debt rates within the NEW-8.
32 ERM II participation is required for the NEW-8 in the two-year period prior to actual Euro
adoption.
33 There are also other interpretations assuming a narrow ERM band of 2.25% (articulated by
the former EU Monetary Affairs Commissioner Pedro Solbes et al.).a crucial ingredient precipitating currency crises in emerging market
economies. In contrast, FDI is often regarded as providing a safer and more
stable way to finance development or convergence, because it supposedly
reduces the risk of currency crises. Figure 10 displays the composition of
foreign capital stocks in the NEW-8. The fraction of FDI in the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland lies above 50%, whereas portfolio investment
presents a smaller fraction of foreign capital stocks in the NEW-8. Thus the
composition of capital inflows in the NEW-8 mitigates the risk of currency
crises.
But this does not imply that FDI investors, since they lose from a currency
crisis, will be unwilling to speculate against the country. Once rumors of
devaluation spread, FDI investors have a strong incentive to hedge against
capital losses due to the decrease in the international value of their assets in
the country. Hence, they will take a short position against the currency and/or
the stock market index in the country. Thus FDI investors can also contribute
to massive volatility in short-term capital flows. This may translate into asset
price volatility (Wagner and Berger, (2004)) affecting fiscal revenue (via
capital gains taxes and wealth-based taxes, via capital transaction taxes and
via wealth effects on consumption and hence indirect taxes) and thus
increasing the volatility of fiscal balances.
34
To minimize these risks, there is an urgent need to further upgrade financial
and institutional infrastructure and improve the fiscal policy course in the
NEW-8 (see below).
B. Adverse structural characteristics
The fiscal challenges derived above become even more critical against the
background of the existence of unfavorable structural characteristics in the
NEW-8. The most important issues are the need to upgrade infrastructure and
the future expenditure pressures from rapidly aging populations.
35
24 Fiscal Challenges through Structural Changes
34 In addition, asset price changes can undermine private sector financial balance sheets to
such an extent that the government is forced to bail out severely hit companies and financial
institutions to avoid a spreading and thus aggravation of the crisis. Finally, there are second round
effects that may adversely affect public finances (Eschenbach and Schuknecht, (2002)). 
35 Further unfavorable structural characteristics in some NEW-8 countries are high long-term
unemployment, which aggravates the challenges resulting from the adverse demographic
development,and a trend toward fiscal decentralization, particularly in the Czech Republic and
Poland (cf. Schadler et al., (2005)). Need to upgrade infrastructure
Because of legacies from the past, the NEW-8 have a substantial need to
upgrade their infrastructure. Not only did many of these former planned
economies inherit very large industrial sectors, there are general shortfalls in
the quality of the infrastructure with under-provision in some sectors (e.g.,
roads) and overcapacity in others (e.g., rail)
36. Especially the quality of the
road network is far from an advanced level (Table 7). Moreover, the general
thinking about how the economic system functions and the role of the state
was very different to that in democratic market economies.Although dramatic
changes have occurred concerning this, and substantial progress on the road
to becoming efficient, well-functioning market economies have been made,
the adjustment process is not yet over.
37 This means that entry into the EU
does not signify the end of the transition process for these countries. 
The Transition Report of the EBRD ((2004), p. 15) emphasizes that
“formidable institutional challenges remain”. This assessment is confirmed
by the EBRD’s most recent Transition Report: “Progress in reform of
infrastructure (...) has lagged behind other areas of transition” so that “further
strengthening of the regulatory framework and tariff structures, especially for
water, is still needed across nearly all countries and sectors” (EBRD, (2005),
p. 10). A recent study by Deutsche Bank Research (2004) guesses that the
CEECs (including Bulgaria and Romania) need to invest around EUR 500bn,
if they are to achieve the level of infrastructure found in the old EU. The




Like many other countries (IMF, (2004b)), the NEW-8 suffer from the
mounting problem of adverse demographic developments. Their
demographic outlook indicates that the aggregate population of these
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36 For a more detailed view of the infrastructure characteristics in the NEW-8 see EBRD
((2004), Chap. 3 and 4).
37 Transformation of societies and cultures implies a change in socialization (social thinking
and behavior) that takes more than just one or two decades. This may cause difficulties in
implementing necessary market-oriented reform processes in the NEW-8 (see, e.g., Wagner, (2002,
2003)).
38 Other fiscal implications of these legacies from the communist period appear, for example,
in the burdens resulting from remaining financial sector reform, large-scale privatization,
economy/enterprise restructuring and enhancing competition (see EBRD, (2005)).countries will decrease, fertility will be very low, and most of the NEW-8
countries will have a strong negative migration balance.
39 Moreover,
challenges facing pension systems in the NEW-8 include relatively low
effective retirement ages, increasing life expectancy, and expenditure
pressures due to indexation rules (Lambrecht et al., (2003)). Figures 11 and 12
show the forecasts for the demographic development. Compared to EU-15,
the change in population as well as the increase in the old-age dependency
ratio up to 2050 will be worse in the NEW-8. In view of the fiscal challenges
posed by aging populations, the sustainability of public finances will
increasingly become a core policy objective in the NEW-8 during the coming
years.
40 Aging populations combined with pay-as-you-go (PAYG) defined
pension systems could lead to a substantial increase in public expenditures in
several NEW-8 and will tend to produce budgetary problems (see Figure 13
for the development forecasted in some of the NEW-8). Health-care
expenditures as well will likely be severely affected by increasing life
expectancy over the last years (see Figure 14 for the recent development of
health-care expenditures in the NEW-8). Hence, the European Commission
(2004) refers to the expected expenditure increases due to population aging as
the major fiscal risk the NEW-8 are exposed to in the coming years.
41
When the old-age dependency ratio
42 increases, the active labor force will
decrease, and this will lower economic growth unless there is a sufficiently
high increase in overall productivity to compensate for this. The main
question is how to record governments’unfunded social security obligations.
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39 In the NEW-8, a similar, but in the beginning less pronounced, downward trend to that in
the EU-15 has occurred since 1960 (see Dickmann, (2004)). A dramatic downward trend in the
birthrate started only in the 1990s, after the political system change, due to increased uncertainty
and change in values (cf. Dorbritz and Philipov, (2002)).
40 But this will not only be a problem in the NEW-8 but also in most of the old EU member
states. The results of current policy scenarios undertaken by the Ageing Working Group attached
to the Economic Policy Committee of the EU Commission (EPC, (2003b)) show that spending on
public pensions is projected to increase by between 3 and 5 percentage points of GDP in most
member states in coming decades (by 2050), if no corrective actions are taken. Public expenditure
on health care and long-term care (following from demographic changes) are projected to increase
by between 1.5 and 4 percentage points of GDP up to 2050.
41 The most recent IMF World Economic Outlook (IMF, (2004b)), by conducting a broad panel
analysis, comes (among other things) to the following results with respect to the consequences of
rapidly aging populations:
(1) “Per capita GDP growth is positively correlated with changes in the relative size of the
working-age population.” 
(2) “Government budgets are adversely affected by population aging due to higher spending
on pensions, health care, and long-term residential care.”
42 The old-age dependency ratio is defined as persons aged 65 or over as a percentage of the
working-age population (aged 15–64).The increasing ratio of retirees to workers reduces the rate of returns of
unfunded PAYG social security. This should induce welfare-maximizing
politicians to prefer small such systems and a larger role for private savings.
However, public choice considerations suggest that an aging electorate
increases the relevance of pension spending on the agenda of office-seeking
policy makers and tends to increase the size of unfunded pension systems.
Calibrating the strength of these effects for the larger EU countries and the
US, Galasso and Profeta (2004) found that the latter political aspect always
outweighed the former.
A general strategy to address the budgetary implications of aging includes
(with variances across countries) raising employment and participation rates
through measures such as family benefits, reducing public debt, and
reforming pension and health care systems.
43 Comprehensive reform
strategies of the pension systems will contain initiatives aimed at offsetting
the effects of aging through reforms of the basic parameters of public pension
systems (e.g., the retirement age, the replacement rate or the contribution rate)
with the aim of improving incentives to work and strengthening the link
between contributions and benefits.
44 In addition, reform of the health care
systems requires deep restructuring. The design of the health care system in
the former communist period showed some inefficiencies due to the socialist
principle of “free treatment” that is today still reflected in a high density of
hospitals, an oversized medical specialist sector, and insufficient emphasis on
prevention. However, a dilemma tends to arise insofar as implementation of
these reforms is likely to involve considerable budgetary costs that could
conflict with, and thus discourage, needed fiscal reform (Schadler et al.,
(2005)). In addition, the former economic system left a set of rules and
expectations that is very difficult for the current generation to honor, but is
also very difficult for the working generation to abrogate.
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43 This is the strategy that has been developed by the Ecofin Council for the EU as a whole
(see EPC, (2003a)). 
44 The pension reform process in Poland is often regarded as the most advanced in the NEW-8
(cf. Chłoń-Domińczak and Góra, (2003)).4. Need for Fiscal Reforms
In the foregoing sections we have argued that the NEW-8 are likely to face
several serious fiscal challenges already in the short to medium term. This is
based on the short-term fiscal strains from EU membership, a potential
decrease in tax income due to tax competition (globalization), and substantial
future expenditure pressures, notably from rapidly aging populations and the
need to upgrade infrastructure.
The question arises what the appropriate fiscal stance in the NEW-8 would be
to maintain macroeconomic stability against the background of these
simultaneously upcoming fiscal challenges and an environment of rapid
institutional and structural change and high capital mobility.
In order to prevent deficits from getting out of control, the NEW-8 must
develop strategies of fiscal consolidation early on. Basically, they have two
options for this: they can reduce their public expenditures, and/or try to
increase public revenues. In either alternative, quantitative as well as
qualitative measures should be taken into consideration. In the following, we
shall analyze the challenges and difficulties in specifying and then
implementing these options of fiscal consolidation.
It might be argued that the fears of significant fiscal challenges in the
NEW-8 following EU membership, which are associated with adverse
structural characteristics, may be exaggerated, because there may also be
scope for expansionary fiscal consolidation in the NEW-8. There is some
experience in countries that previously joined the EU that suggests
common institutional preconditions for such an outcome (see e.g.,
Giavazzi and Pagano, (1990), Giudice et al., (2003)). However, with
regard to the NEW-8, one has to take account of the different starting
position of these countries compared to that of the successful expansionary
fiscal consolidators within the EU in the 1980s and 1990s. The evidence
to-date, emphasized in a recent IMF study (Schadler et al. (2005)),
suggests that the scope for such expansionary fiscal consolidations is
likely to be quite limited in the NEW-8. The benefits in terms of lower
yield spreads have already largely been accrued in these countries. In
addition, the debt stock in these countries is, on average, relatively small;
and this means they can expect to gain only relatively small amounts from
29interest savings.
45 There also seems to be little evidence that the NEW-8
experienced expansionary fiscal contractions during the 1990s, but fiscal
contractions apparently did not have a significantly negative impact on
growth either (see Purfield, (2003)).
Therefore, fiscal consolidation will rather be a real challenge for the NEW-8.
The need for fiscal consolidation requires determination with respect to
restructuring the budget and innovativeness with regard to increasing the
efficiency of public spending and collecting tax revenues.
46 Efficient public
spending and increased efficiency of collecting tax revenues will be crucial
not only to alleviate budgetary pressure, but also to release resources
necessary to adequately support the use of EU transfers. Reducing the
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Box 3: Effects of More Efficient Public Spending and Taxing
According to theory, the net social benefits from government action are maximized
when the social marginal cost of raising revenue (SMC) and the social marginal
benefits of spending revenue (SMB) are equal. Figure II shows the initial efficient
supply of public goods given at the quantity R0.
47
Figure II. Effects of More Efficient Public Spending and a More Efficient Tax System
Increasing the efficiency of spending shifts the SMB curve upward, thus raising
efficient public spending to R1 without imposing an additional tax burden on the
economy. Reducing the inefficiencies of the tax system shifts the SMC curve
downward, thus increasing the optimal level of government expenditure further to R*.
The difference between R* and R0 can be used to match EU transfers without reducing
the provision of public goods and without an increase in the excess burden of taxation.inefficiencies of the tax systems at any given level of expenditures would
imply less distortion and generate further net benefits for society (see Box 3).
A. Expenditures
It is often argued that fiscal consolidations that rely mainly on expenditure
cuts are more successful in reducing public deficits than consolidation
measures that are mainly based on raising taxes (see the remarks on good
quality adjustments below). Thus, a frequently made recommendation for the
NEW-8 is to slim their welfare systems down in order to reduce successfully
public expenditure.
In many NEW-8 countries, most notably in the larger new member states, the
share of social transfers in public spending is comparable with current
developments in the old member states (see Figure 15). With regard
especially to the challenges arising from aging populations and the resulting
demand for more age and health related public transfers, there is a need to
reform (and strengthen the efficiency of) the transfers systems and social
security in particular (cf. ECB, (2004), p. 17f.).
48 On the whole, the expected
increases in social expenditures seem to be the “major fiscal risks” in the
NEW-8 (European Commission, (2004), p. 34f.). Apoorly targeted and overly
generous social transfer system is not only the main source of mounting
public deficits, but also a strong disincentive to search for work and to create
employment.
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45 Interest savings relative to GDP are estimated to range from about negative 1/2 a percentage
point in the Czech Republic to 11/2 percentage points in Hungary (see Schadler et al., (2005)).
46 It is worth mentioning that in some of the old EU member states, e. g. Germany, there is also
an urgent need for fiscal consolidation. The difficulty of adjusting the budget of these countries in
order to fulfill the rules of the SGParises, to a substantial degree, from the difficulties of enforcing
structural reforms in fiscally sensitive areas such as social insurance and labor market legislation.
This suggests that fiscal consolidation is very closely linked to successfully establishing structural
reforms.
47 In Box 3, the SMB curve reflects individuals’ valuation of public goods at different
quantities. The positive slope of the SMC curve reflects distortions in the allocation of resources
and deadweight losses of taxation (except taxation on goods that generate a negative externality)
that increase with the government’s revenue.
48 In general, however, an increase in social security spending may also reflect public
recognition of the existence of market failures in some insurance markets. In addition, there are
also arguments supporting the view that greater equity and higher levels of social protection may
have a beneficial effect (up to a certain threshold) on efficiency, productivity and national
competitiveness (see Fourage, (2003), DeGrauwe and Polan, (2003)). However, a reform/cutting-back of the welfare system may be particularly
difficult in the NEW-8 because they may have a different view about the
role of government due to their post-communist background (Alesina and
Fuchs-Schündeln, (2005), Tanzi and Schuknecht, (2000)). The more functions
a society expects from its government, the larger will be the level of public
spending that is required, and the greater will be the willingness of the public
to accept a larger tax burden to enable the government to perform those
functions. The fact that, relative to non-transition economies with
a comparable per capita income,
49 large welfare systems still exist in the
NEW-8, particularly in the Višégrad countries, can be interpreted in this light.
Of course, the difficulties in carrying out needed but unpopular public
expenditure cuts vary from country to country. Investigating under which
conditions expenditure cuts can best be implemented, requires taking into
account these country-specific structures of government expenditures and
institutional conditions most suitable for streamlining government
expenditures. Here, one has to bear in mind that, on the one hand, especially
in the larger NEW-8, the large share of mandatory items in the budget related
to social spending limits the scope for expenditure cuts (see Figure 15). This
means that in these countries legal restraints might introduce excessive
rigidity into government fiscal policy.
50 The governments have limited
legislative policy options, making it difficult to change spending priorities
without changes in institutional conditions. On the other hand, the strength of
electoral cycle effects on fiscal policy in the individual NEW-8 countries has
to be taken into account. Hallerberg and Souza (2002) confirm that the
NEW-8’s governments acted very much like their OECD counterparts, and,
where possible, manipulated the economy before elections. Hence, these
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49Aprominent hypothesis in public finance (known as “Wagner’s Law”) suggests that the rise
in public spending is an inherent feature of the development process and that total government
expenditure would grow with the rise in per capita incomes (Mueller, (1989)). In the light of this
hypothesis, the share of government in the NEW-8 could be expected to be lower than in the
advanced Eurozone countries and tend to rise in the years to come. Assuming an increasing impact
of globalization in the NEW-8 over the next few years, this is supported by another hypothesis that
argues that globalization implies more openness, and more open economies appear to prefer larger
governments (IMF, (2004a)). This preference for larger governments may reflect the fact that more
open economies are more exposed to external shocks and thus may prefer larger governments, as
conjectured by Rodrik (1998) and critically analyzed by Alesina and Warcziag (1998).
50 In this context, also the danger of credit and demand booms should not be underestimated
in these countries (cf. EBRD, (2005), p. 39). Since shifting the stance of fiscal policy rapidly
proves difficult when discretionary spending is a rather small share of total spending, preventing
overheating and other unsustainable strains on the economies requires that fiscal balances are
positioned well in advance of possible credit and demand booms to exercise the necessary restraint
on demand (for more details, see Schadler et al., (2005)).authors suggest the need for institutional solutions, such as installing
a “strong” finance minister or negotiated fiscal contracts, to lessen the scale
of fiscal political business cycles.
51
What is most important for successful fiscal consolidation against the
background of these difficulties, is promoting (i) appropriate budgetary
institutions, (ii) good quality of fiscal adjustment, and perhaps (iii) social
cohesion.
(i) Empirical evidence shows that different budget institutions may lead to
different degrees of fiscal discipline.
52 Different studies found that more
hierarchical-transparent procedures are associated with more fiscal
discipline.
53 In these studies, hierarchical procedures are understood as those
that, in particular, attribute more power to the Treasury than to spending
ministers in intra-government negotiations and that limit the role of the
parliament in amending the budget proposed by the government. In particular
lack of transparency may increase the cost of adhering to fiscal discipline.
54
Caution regarding fiscal decentralization also hinges upon the common pool
problem.
55 The basic problem here is that public budgeting involves an
externality arising from a misperception about the true budget constraint and
true shadow relative prices of public policy measures when the structure of
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51 However, given that strong finance ministers tend to work best in countries with one-party
governments or in countries where there are two clearly opposing blocks of parties (see Hallerberg
and von Hagen, (1999)), it is likely that this solution will be difficult to put into practice in the
NEW-8 countries with quite unsettled political landscapes.
52 Budget institutions are all the rules and regulations according to which budgets are prepared,
approved, and implemented. Because these formal and informal rules and their enforcement
mechanisms shape the behavior of organizations and individuals (e.g. taxpayers) in society, they
are important determinants of fiscal outcomes.
53 See Alesina and Perotti (1996a) with regard to OECD and Latin American countries. See
also Gleich (2003) who, by exploring the linkage between the institutional design of budget
processes and the aggregate fiscal performance in ten EU acceding countries, finds that countries
whose institutions are more conducive to coordination and cooperation in decision making  (these
are the smaller acceding countries) have been more successful in lowering budget deficits and
reducing debt levels.
54 Alesina and Perotti (1996b) suggest the use of independent agencies, outside of the
government bureaucracy, to check the accuracy and transparency of public budgets.
55 This common pool problem tends to be more pronounced in larger, more decentralized
economies. Correspondingly, fiscal control may simply be harder in the large NEW-8 countries.
This may reflect these countries’ larger problems with regard to fiscal consolidation (i.e., their
higher deficit rates). It may also reflect the lower value that large countries (compared to small
countries) attribute to the prospect of early euro adoption. According to the theory of optimal
currency areas, the large countries benefit less from a currency union, therefore delay is a less
effective deterrent. the budget process allows decentralized spending determination. This means
that clear mechanisms (e.g., borrowing ceilings on local governments) are
necessary to ensure budgetary discipline at the lower levels.
Moreover, the quality of the budgetary adjustments undertaken in part is
contingent on the quality of expenditure management and medium-term fiscal
planning. Successful budgetary consolidation needs to be governed by policy
actions ensuring long-term fiscal sustainability by anticipating, among other
things, aging-related expenditures. The effect of institutions will be crucial in
the enlarged EU as a properly designed budgetary process may improve the
ability of policymakers to initiate and sustain expenditure restructuring.
56
(ii) Studies of fiscal adjustment in the OECD countries show that the size and
composition of restructuring the budget are decisive factors in enduringly
reducing the primary structural deficit. Alesina and Perotti (1995) find that
fiscal consolidations relying more heavily on cuts in current expenditures are
more likely to succeed in reducing public deficits than those relying on tax
increases. Moreover, Alesina and Ardagna (1998) confirm that the
composition of adjustment is of more importance than the size: sustainable
adjustments are those that concentrate, in particular, on cuts in transfers and
government wages.
In addition, the overall efficiency of social spending could be improved to
some extent by such measures as tightening the eligibility criteria. That is,
a main emphasis should be laid on a more precise targeting of social spending
toward those who really need it (decreasing the level of abuse of the social
security system). Furthermore, more effort will be needed to improve the
administration of the social security system. However, if a sustainable fiscal
adjustment should guarantee enough room for a reorientation of government
expenditure toward growth-enhancing programs such as infrastructure
development and education, the efficiency of collecting tax revenues must
also be addressed.
(iii) In the context of implementation of fiscal reforms, the ability to create
social cohesion could play an important role. Social dialogue can be an
important supportive factor in implementing difficult fiscal reforms,
especially if traditional policy mechanisms prove to be ineffective in securing
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56 In particular, improving fiscal transparency and adopting a medium-term budget framework
(MTBF) can have a positive effect on fiscal outcomes. The adoption of a medium-term budget
framework is strongly advocated in chapter 7 of Feldman and Watson (2002).long-term objectives of fiscal consolidation. The way in which social partners
cooperate with the government may be crucial not only for wage moderation
but also equally important for retrenching public expenditure and reducing
tax burden, and slimming the welfare system. In most NEW-8, governments
and social partners have been strongly involved since the very beginning of
the reforms in social dialogue designed to deal with urgent and large-scale
reforms. Recent research that analyzes the role of social cohesion for
implementing reforms in low-income countries suggests that more social
cohesion leads to better institutions and thus to higher growth.
57 However,
there is no universal model for social cohesion, and the scope of arrangements
for social cohesion should be adapted to national conditions and to the
specific situation in the single countries. The simplest form of social cohesion
(which, however, might be the least efficient one) is an informal social
dialogue between different social groups.
58 But implementation of a general
overhaul of social protection could be facilitated by a more active social
dialogue, going beyond gathering together ad hoc working groups. An
adequate legal and administrative framework conducive to effective social
dialogue depends largely on the capability of the partners to discuss the




Against the background of the (globalization-based) increase in competition
described above, accompanied by an increase in production factor mobility, it
has been argued that there is less flexibility on the revenue side with respect
to raising government revenues. This tendency raises the question of how to
react, particularly whether and how to restructure the sources of government
revenues, and how to improve the effectiveness of revenue collection.
As argued in section 3, the increase in competition and in mobility of
production factors, brought about by globalization and EU-integration, may
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57 See Ritzen et al. (2000). In addition, IMF (2003c) emphasizes that successful market-based
economies need institutions that will promote social cohesion and stability to reduce conflicts in
the society and the consequences of economic disruption.
58 Rychly and Pritzer (2003) argue that international experience shows that social dialogue is
particularly vital when pension reforms are planned and implemented.
59 Nevertheless, the budgetary procedures will be a crucial element of institutional design,
because only an appropriately designed budget process can counterbalance the pressure of myopic
political forces. imply that the fiscal burden has mainly to be carried by the less mobile
production factor, i.e. labor. By contrast, the more mobile production factors
will need to be privileged. According to the Ramsey rule for efficient taxation,
the governments are advised to set taxes inversely proportional to the supply
elasticity of the tax base.
60 If the elasticity of supply of capital is high and the
elasticity of supply of labor is low, the Ramsey rule implies that the tax rate on
capital income should be lower than the tax rate on labor income.
61 With
increasing internationalization of economic activity, the tax base, which is
inelastic in a closed economy, will become increasingly elastic. Capital will
become a particularly internationally mobile factor, but (to a lesser extent) so
will skilled labor. This means that after joining the EU the tax systems in
NEW-8 countries will become even more exposed to arbitrage pressure
resulting from differences in tax rates and from the supply elasticity of the tax
base. At the same time, the scope for tax avoidance and evasion will also be
extended.
On average, calculations of effective tax rates on capital vs labor income for
EU countries support the predictions of theoretical models that increased
capital mobility leads to a shift in the tax mix away from the taxation of capital
and towards taxation of wages (Haufler, (2001), p. 69). However, one has to
bear in mind that against the background of the political process underlying the
determination of factor taxes as analyzed in the public choice literature, the
superiority of Ramsey-rule-based tax policies may be disputed (cf. Holcombe,
(2002) for a discussion of this issue with respect to excise taxes).
So far, however, on the revenue side, social security contribution rates have
remained high in the NEW-8 compared to the EU-15 level, in particular in
the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia (Figure 16). Even in the Baltic
countries showing the lowest contribution rates among the NEW-8 these rates
are currently still high compared to core EU member states with similar size
(Figure 16). Therefore the scope for raising social security contribution rates
further seems to be somewhat limited in the NEW-8. However, with regard to
personal income taxes, these countries (except Lithuania) show significantly
lower rates compared to the EU-15 (Figure 17). Nonetheless, further increasing
taxes on labor (and thus labor costs in general) may have adverse effects.
62
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60 See Ramsey (1927).
61 The dual income tax (DIT) model adopted by the Scandinavian countries, leaning more on
labor than on capital, is close to the spirit of the Ramsey rule (see Gordon, (2000)).
62 Recently, the European Commission expressed concern that high taxes on labor may be an
obstacle to a job-intensive strategy in new EU member countries (European Commission, (2002),
p. 137).In the recent years, the tendency towards shifting the burden of taxation
towards labor has become a cause for concern also in the EU-15 countries
(Haufler, (2001), p. 18). This concern is supported by reasoning in the recent
literature suggesting that in countries where unions can shift the burden of
labor taxes to firms, such taxes may exert more distorting effects (especially
in the form of possible adverse long-term labor market effects) than capital
and consumption taxes would do (Daveri and Tabellini, (2000)). High tax
wedges on labor result in higher real wages and thus reduce the demand for
labor. If firms then start to substitute capital for labor, the marginal product of
capital will decrease, eliminating an important stimulus for investment and
growth. Therefore, in view of high labor taxes (including social security
contributions) reflecting the cost of generous welfare systems (mainly
through rising pension expenditures), reforms resulting in savings on social
spending could bring long-run benefits of higher employment, investment
and growth. Thus, reforms aimed at a more precise targeting of social
protection and/or reducing the coverage of social insurance as well as
improving the administration of the social security system may have
important effects on growth prospects.
In addition, there also seems to be room for maneuver with regard to
restructuring revenues so that better incentives can be set for domestic and
foreign investors. Shifting the tax burden from direct to indirect taxes may
have a lasting positive effect on economic growth, provided a conducive
environment for human and physical capital formation will be created
(UN, (2004), pp. 124ff.). Theory suggests that direct taxes tend to have larger
distorting impacts on economic decisions and thus on the economy-wide
allocation of resources.
63 A tax mix relying more on consumption taxes may
have several advantages, as they are rather neutral towards saving and
investment decision and, by securing a symmetric treatment of labor and
capital income, generate fewer disincentives to work (see Jourmard (2001),
p. 17). Therefore, from the viewpoint of economic efficiency, a tax system
with a relatively low level of direct taxation might be favorable.
64
Accordingly, the general intention to gradually shift the tax burden from labor
towards consumption was spelt out in the 2002 Pre-Accession Economic
Programs (PEPs) (EPC, (2003a)). Slovenia had already moved in this
direction, but this was also the intention of the Slovak tax reform of 2003 with
the underlying principle of introducing a flat tax rate (of 19%) throughout the
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63 Progressivity in direct taxation, particularly with regard to labor income, may strengthen
such impacts (see UN, (2004)). 
64 See, for example, Tanzi and Zee (1997), or Stokey and Rebelo (1995).whole economy.
65 It was expected that by removing exemptions and
improving tax administration, thus bringing lower rates of direct taxation
without significant erosion of revenues, a stimulating effect on investment
would arise. In fact tax revenues in the Slovak Republic even slightly
exceeded expected figures in 2004 (cf. Moore, (2005)).
However, there are economic counter arguments against shifting the tax
burden from direct to indirect taxes. On the one hand, it may be argued that
the standard VAT rates in the larger NEW-8 countries are already high by
international comparison (see UN, (2004), p. 13, see also Table 8), whereas,
direct taxes such as the CIT rate in the NEW-8 are rather low (Table 8).
Therefore, raising effective consumption tax revenue would have to occur, to
a large extent, through a broadening of the tax base (and through higher
excise duties and eco-taxes).
66 In addition, the effectiveness of tax collection
and tax administration needs to be improved significantly.
67
On the other hand, there are also counter arguments based on considerations
of social equity and justice. It is argued that increasing consumption taxes
(resulting in higher prices) would disproportionately affect the real
consumption of people with generally low incomes. Moreover, this might
result in an overall reduction in final consumer demand, with negative
consequences on economic growth, at least in the short term. In view of this,
and the current relatively low level of revenue from direct taxation (both CIT
and PIT) in the NEW-8 compared with the EU-15 countries (see Figure 18),
it might be suggested that these countries should think of shifting towards
higher levels of direct taxation, in order to increase tax revenues and, at the
same time, achieve a higher degree of tax harmonization in the EU (see, for
such a proposal, UN (2004), pp. 142f.).
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65 In particular, the Slovak reform which took effect on January 1
st 2004 aimed at improving
the efficiency of resource allocation by reducing the progressivity of the tax system (see, for such
a proposal, UN, (2004), pp. 124ff.). 
66 In particular, reconsidering the extensive use of reduced VAT rates and exemption could
raise the yield of consumption taxes, while reducing non-neutralities of the tax system.
67 Broadening the tax base and improving the effectiveness of tax collection are of general
concern. During the years of transition, in order to attract more FDI, the NEW-8 have not only
reduced statutory CIT rates (from on average over 30 percent in 1999 to around 20 percent in
2003, see UN, (2004), p. 128), they have also introduced many exemptions affecting the tax base
(for example zero tax rate for reinvested earnings in Estonia). In 2002, the revenues from CIT in
the NEW-8 were, on average, 6.8 percent of total tax revenues, against around 9 percent in the
EU-15 (UN, (2004), p.137). However, raising direct taxation in the NEW-8 would tend to create
disincentives for the owners of mobile production factors and worsen the
position of the NEW-8 in the locational competition process outlined above.
Accordingly, the current trend in these countries regarding taxation appears to
be in the opposite direction, i.e., towards relying more on indirect taxes. On
average, in 2003, the share of direct taxes in total tax revenues was 8% lower
in the NEW-8 countries than in the EU-15 countries, whereas the share of
indirect taxes was 5% higher (see Figure 18).
In the medium term, there may be greater scope for revenue mobilization
as growth and incomes increase. Fiscal development can be influenced by
government policies to enhance growth prospects and reduce fluctuations,
because growth eases government finances through higher revenues and
lower transfer payments. Growth enhancing efforts should include
adjustments in complicated tax structures, resulting in improvements in the
environment for business investment (Tanzi and Zee, (1997)). In addition,
further structural reforms (particularly on the labor and product markets) are
urgently needed to enhance economic growth. However, even though better
growth prospects after joining the EU may alleviate budgetary pressure in the
NEW-8, no sustainable improvement can be expected without addressing
structural weaknesses and inefficiencies in raising revenue.
Need for Fiscal Reforms 395. Conclusions
The NEW-8 are facing a range of fiscal challenges stemming from EU
membership, on the one hand, and from developments essentially
independent of EU membership, on the other hand. This paper has argued
that the main challenge for the NEW-8 is not the direct fiscal cost of EU
membership (per se) but arises from the impact of globalization (locational
competition) and country-specific structural characteristics or developments,
such as population aging and the need for upgrading infrastructure.
68
Therefore, the NEW-8 should concentrate on carrying out the major policy
adjustments necessary for mastering these long-term structural challenges
instead of focusing their attention on how to join the EMU as soon as
possible. There is an urgent need to speed up with implementing structural
and institutional reforms in most NEW-8. This, together with the
requirements of EU membership and upcoming Euro adoption, may produce
a considerable fiscal challenge for many of the NEW-8. Therefore, it appears
to be imperative for them to conduct a straightforward, credible course of
fiscal consolidation. This requires restructuring their budgets (as well as
their social security and pension systems) and increasing the efficiency of
public spending and tax collection. 
However, this needs to be done in a way that avoids worsening their position
in the (globalization-based) locational competition process for mobile
production factors. In particular, when trying to get public support for
necessary reform measures, governments may be tempted to compensate
losers from reforms through the budget, financed through tax increases (or
through subsidies or transfer payments).
69 This, however, could have adverse
effects on attracting capital necessary to finance infrastructure investment.
41
68Afurther issue is that the macroeconomic performance and fiscal performance of the old EU
members is rather unsatisfactory. The NEW-8 have joined a club with a lot of problems. The
Stability and Growth Pact has been weakened in the summer of 2005 which of course has some
implications for the adjustment burden that must be carried by the new EU members. 
69 Problems in obtaining broad political support for fiscal reforms usually arise from the
uneven distribution of benefits and costs of reforms across the economy and over time. Industrial
countries’ experiences over the past decades show that opposition to reforms is more likely to be
overcome when the budgetary situation allows losers from reforms to be compensated through the
budget (IMF, (2004a)).In this situation, combining various necessary reforms may be helpful as it
may create important synergies and reduce short-term costs,
70 which makes
the reforms more acceptable politically.
42 Conclusions
70 Especially reforms on the labor and product markets could make wages and prices more
flexible, thus increasing their ability to absorb shocks and shorten recessions induced by fiscal
consolidation (IMF, (2004a); see also footnote 46 above).6. References
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a) Public Deficits, 2003–2006
b) Public Debts, 2003–2006
Source: Eurostat.
51Figure 2. Net Earningsof Employees in Manufacturing (EUR), 2002
EU-South here refers to Greece, Portugal and Spain.
Source: Eurostat (2004)
Figure 3. Unemployment Rates
1) in the NEW-8, 2002–2004























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2Figure 6. Net FDI Inflows (percent of GDP), 1995–2004
Source: IMF (2005).
Figure 7. Net Capital Inflows (percent of GDP), 1995–2004
Source: IMF (2005).
56Figure 8. Current Account Balance (percent of GDP), 2002 and 2006
Source: EC (2004a).
Figure 9. Total Short-term External Debt to Official Reserves (percentage),
2001–2003
Data for EE from 2003 and for PL and SK from 2002 on are projections.
Data for Hungary: 0.9% in 2001 and 0.7% in 2002.
Data for Latvia not available.
Source: IMF (2004).
57Figure 10. Structures of Foreign Capital Stocks, 2004
Source: IMF (2005).
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(percentage), 2000–2010
Source: UN (2004) – own calculations.
58Figure 12. Old Age Dependency Ratio (percentage), 2000–2050
Source: UN (2004) – own calculations.
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Source: data for the CZ, HU, PL: OECD (2004) data for the remaining countries: Lambrecht et al., (2003).
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Source: WHO.
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Source: EC (2004a).
60Figure 16: Total Social Contribution (percent of GDP), 2000–2005
EU-small here refers to Denmark, Finland and Ireland 
Source: EC (2005).
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Source: EC (2005).
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